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SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS AS LAND DEVELOPERS
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THE stereotyped American housing development-unsightly, un-
imaginative and inefficient-is the usual work of small, undercapitalized
builders. Their scale of operations prevents them from creating planned
communities or new towns which offer neighborhood parks, planned
school sites, and other such amenities.1
The small developer's lifeline is the savings and loan association. 2
This is where he obtains funds for real estate projects that are too
small and too risky to raise even an investigation from most banks
and life insurance companies. Savings associations survive by paying
a higher rate of interest than banks, and they need the extra margin
that small builders are willing to pay to finance their speculative ven-
tures.3
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1. "The largest developments are able to provide a complete set of community facili-
ties, including a shopping center, as an integrated part of the whole. In the Levittoums,
even schools have been built by the developer at no cost to the municipality. Develop-
ments of several hundred houses still can offer some common facilities such as play.
grounds, a disposal system, or a group of local stores. By contrast, the only community
facility a small subdivision of 10 to 50 houses can offer is a new stret-a loop or
cul-de-sac, and still smaller groups as well as individual houses locate as a rule on an
existing road, which, quite often, ought not to be permitted to become a residential
street, both in consideration of the resident's safety and of traffic capacity." TUNNAnD &
PUSHEAREV, MAN-MADE AEmcA: CHAOS OR Co.N TrOL 79 (1963).
2. Cf. GRm LER & BRIGHAM, SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE MAnErs IN CALtFORIA 52-61 (1963);
HERzOG, THE DYNAmIcIS OF LARGE-Scum- HOUSF.BUHMuG 33-56 (Institute of Business and
Economic Research, University of California, Berkeley, Research Report 22, 1963). Cali-
fornia statistics are particularly important; savings and loan assets in California are the
largest in the nation-over $23 billion. Illinois follows with $10 billion, Ohio with $9
billion, and New York with $7 billion. UNrrD STATES SAVINGS AND LOAN LEAcuE, &%vwrcs
AND LOAN FAcT BOOK 81 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 FACT Boor].
3. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) series showing home mortgage in-
terest rates and terms for conventional first mortgage loans currently made by type of
institution reveals the following for December, 1964:
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Of course, mortgage loans are not the only source of high-yield
real estate investment opportunities. Better rates of return would be
available to savings associations if they invested directly in large-scale,
planned real estate developments.4 But the associations are regulated
by outdated laws that impose strict separation of the investment and
PURCHASE OF NEw SINGLE FAMILY HO.EtS
Term of Purchase
Interest Rate Fees, Charges Contract Loan to Price Price
(per cent) (per cent) (years) (per cent) (thousands)
All Lenders 5.76 0.59 25.2 73.9 24.3
Savings & Loan Assns. 5.85 0.65 25.2 76.7 23.2
Life Insurance
Companies 5.53 0.20 26.8 68.5 28.8
Mortgage
Companies 5.72 0.91 27.1 74.4 25.2
Commercial
Banks 5.67 0.09 19.2 62.7 24.4
Mutual Savings
Banks 5.52 0.03 25.1 68.3 24.5
PURCHASE OF EXISTING SINGLE FAMILY HOMES
All Lenders 5.92 0.56 20.1 71.7 19.2
Savings & Loan Assns. 6.02 0.73 20.9 74.6 18.0
Life Insurance
Companies 5.51 0.17 25.0 69.4 28A
Mortgage
Companies 5.52 0.60 23.8 69.2 34.0
Commercial
Banks 5.30 0.16 15.8 63.3 20.0
Mutual Savings
Banks 5.58 0.18 21.9 69.6 21.0
Source: FHLBB, 1965 SAVINGS AND HOME FINANCING SOURCE BOOK 20-21 (1965).
4. In the past decade, land in the United States has appreciated at the rate of 10%
per annum. What about Real Estate as an Investment Now, U.S. News and World
Report, June 20, 1966. In California, the average over a similar span has been 18%
per annum. Interview With Kent Williams, Property Research, Los Angeles, Calif., July
5, 1966. Since 1956, yields on successful shopping centers have ranged from 8 to 15%.
Interview With Walter Clark, Senior Loan Officer, Security First National Bank, Los
Angeles, Calif., Aug. 14, 1966. There are no collected figures on returns on large-scale
planned communities. However, a recent study by the National Association of Home
Builders (NAHB) indicates that the average builder receives 8% to 10%. Interview with
John Malone, Homebuilders Association (Los Angeles affiliate of NAHB), Los Angeles,
Calif., Sept. 7, 1966. With scale economies, this percentage tends to rise. HERzoG, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 22-27.
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development functions. Most states forbid savings associations to pur-
chase and develop land, and in the few permissive states5 the invest-
ment is restricted to a small percentage of an association's total assets.,
If these restrictions were lifted, substantial funds could be diverted
from haphazard, small-scale developments into sizeable, planned com-
munities. Savings and loan associations, which account for nearly
half the non-farm residential mortgage debt, could make a contribu-
tion as properly financed land developers.
DISECONOMIES OF SAI.ALL-SCALE AND UNDERCAPITALIZED DEVELOPMENT
The special villain of suburban housing development, the small,
undercapitalized builder, usually develops small tracts that are difficult
to blend into their natural settings. His site layout suffers as a result,
for achieving harmony with the natural setting is a prime factor in
site design. The beauty of hillside development, for example, may
depend on whether roof lines echo the dominant slope of the ground,
houses ascend the hill in regular steps, and streets follow the contours
of the ground. Unless a single developer controls the entire vista an
investment in site planning and architects' fees will be uneconomic
should adjoining parcels be developed without a sense of taste, imagina-
tion, or order.7 For then buyers will regard the entire area as just an-
other hillside.8 As the small or undercapitalized builder can rarely
afford large parcels, he usually foregoes the expense of site planning
in anticipation of unsightly development nearby.
By including mixed land uses-apartments and houses, shops and
5. ALAsKA STAT. ANN. § 06.30.615 (1962); CAL. FiN. CODE § 6705; FLA. STATs. AsN.,
§ 665.21(8) (Supp. 1964); I.AHO CODE ANN., § 30-1304 (1948); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 799
(1957); IowA CODE ANN. § 534.17 (Supp. 1965); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 23.540 (382) (Supp.
1965); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 369.370 (1952); NEV. REv. STAT. § 673276 (1956); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 393.24 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-15-5 (Supp. 1965); Oss.A. STAT. ANN. § 233
(Supp. 1965); W.&sa. REV. CODE § 33.24.095. Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey,
Maryland, and California account for more than half of the nation's savings associations,
yet only two of these states allow land investment.
6. In a few of these states, such as Illinois, as much as ten per cent of an assoda-
tion's assets may be invested but five per cent is the usual ceiling.
7. The spillover effects of land development are well described elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Mandelker, Controlling Land Values in Areas of Rapid Urban Expansion, 12 U.C.L.A.
L Rxv. 734 (1965); Dagen & Cody, Property, et al. v. Nuisance, et al., 26 LAw & Co.'Ms.
PROB. 70, 79-82 (1961).
8. There is little question that the amenity value of the site as perceived by prospec-
tive buyers is a determinant of land values. See Brigham, The Determinants of Resi-
dential Land Values, 41 LAND ECoN. 325, 328 (1965); Horr, D,.NAMiC FAcrons IN LAND
V~ALUxs 14-15 (U.L.L Tech. Bull. No. 37, 1960).
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schools-large-scale development provides visual diversity, and satisfies
a larger share of the housing market. By contrast, the small tract
builder, hoping to sell quickly and avoid the cost of a careful market
analysis, builds only for the largest sector of the housing market-
young married couples with middle or higher incomes and two or three
children.10 Unlike the large developers he runs no risk of saturating a
sector of market; and in any case the size of his parcel precludes much
variety in his houses or his clientele.
The developers of new towns and planned communities profit by
forestalling strip commercial development in favor of graceful shop-
ping plazas and malls; they know that pleasant shopping facilities
augment the sale of housing in their projects. Shopping center devel-
opers who are unconcerned with adjacent housing, tend to disregard
their impact on neighboring land.
The developer of a large project ordinarily dedicates more land for
9. A series of public hearings conducted by the Northeastern Illinois Planning Com-
mission revealed that the most important planning goal to persons attending the hearings
was the provision of a wide variety of housing types within communities. Moreover,
seventy-five percent of the persons attending desired the encouragement of a wide variety
of commercial, cultural, and civic facilities in suburbia. NORTHEASTERN ILLINOIS PLANNING
CoMsMIssIoN, 8 PLANNING IN NORTHEASTERN ILLINOIS 1-2 (March 1966). See also Tolan,
Redevelopment-Irretrievable Opportunity for Variety, in THE NEW RENEWAL 22, 24
(Duggar ed. 1961). A typical large-scale project would include such types of housing
as single-family detached homes, semi-attached row houses, high-rise cooperative apart-
ments, and retirement housing.
10. In 1964, the average (mean) household size in husband and wife families where
the head was under 45 years of age was 4.4. Of the nearly 21 million such families,
some 20 million were urban and rural non-farm residents; only 2.8 million had no
children. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES: 1965
39 (1965). The following chart illustrates home ownership of non-farm families by age
groups.
Age of
Household Owning Homes Renting Homes Other Total
18-24 years 15% 60% 25% 100%
25-34 years 47 45 8 100
35-44 years 71 26 3 100
45-54 years 72 24 4 100
All non-farm Families 61 32 7 100
Source: 1965 FACT BOOK 31.
Almost three of every four persons who are in the age group 35 to 54 years own their
own homes. 1965 FACT BOOK 31. For selected transactions insured by the FHA under
section 203 for the year 1964, the average mortgagor was 33.2 years of age, enjoyed a
monthly family income of $750.27, had a $15,362, 31.4 year mortgage on a $16,216 home
of 1,206 sq. ft. on a $3,130 site with an average of 5.7 rooms of which 3.1 were bedrooms,
85.5% were 1 story structures, 61.5% had more than I bath, and 79.9% had a garage
or carport. HHFA, 1964 ANNUAL REPORT 123 (1965).
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schools and recreation than even the most aggressive local governments
require through subdivision regulations.11 As he knows, homebuyers
avoid tracts where their children must cross busy streets on the way
to school. Community swimming pools and golf courses pay their
own way in increased sales. But in small tracts there is usually no room
to insert school and park sites, and insufficient housing units to write
off their cost. As a result the entire community, instead of the devel-
opment, bears the costs of its school and park facilities.
12
There is no entirely satisfactory way of making the small, unplanned
development pay for the expenses imposed on its neighbors. Some local
governments have tried to ban all new development or, through
minimum lot size zoning, to control population density. But the courts
have been unsympathetic to these control measures" and home builders
11. Cf. descriptions of Reston and Columbia, two recent new towns, in W.Aisn.
DIEmAiAs oF URBAN ANAmucA 23-26 (1965).
12. See, e.g., Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Corn-
munity Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions 73 tLE .J.
1119, 1119-22 (1964).
There may be situations in which the burden of financing public facilities should
fall upon existing residents of communities, despite the fact that newcomers create
the need for additional facilities. Subdivision fees, like exclusionary zoning, can bar
low income groups from suburbs. Why should suburbs be able to cast Eie burden of
supplying public facilities for the less-well-off exclusively on the central cities in
this way? When low density zoning forces a developer to concentrate on supplying
high income housing markets against his better judgment about prevailing market
trends, perhaps stringent limits on subdivision exactions-which are imposed in addi-
tion to the high per-unit land cost created by exclusionary zoning--are justifiable.
This question was latent in Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Town of Madison, 68 N.J. Super.
197, 172 A.2d 40 (1961), affd without opinion, 78 N.J. Super. 471, 189 A.2d 22.6 (App.
Div. 1963). The developer, who owned 19A miles of the 42 square mile tomship, con-
tracted to donate schoolrooms and land for fire and police stations in return for zoning
which would allow 75 X 100 lots, and some garden apartments, industry. and commer-
cial uses. A later council revoked the contract, and the revocation was sustained. The
court's opinion contained dicta that public service facilities could not be derived from
subdividers but had to be financed out of public funds. Heyman and Gilhool expend
considerable energy attacking this dicta. The facts of the Midtown Properties case, though.
suggest that large-scale developers can afford to dedicate land and to pay for public
service facilities, but only if they can build for the heaviest markets, freed from the
binds of local zoning ordinances. The case also implies that, depending on the strengths
of respective housing markets, there are occasions when a large tract built for moderate
income families is better able to absorb the costs of public facilities than one constructed
for high income groups. This is confirmed by a recent study of New York suburbs by
the Pratt Institute School of Architecture which concluded that the ability of moderate
income developments to support public facilities is generally greater than that of high
income developments, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1966, § 8, p. R1, col. 3.
13. See, e.g., Christine Building Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Miich. 508, 116 NAV.2d 816
(1962) (invalidating a minimum lot size zoning ordinance which required building sites
to be at least 21,780 square feet). But see Padover v. Township of Farmington. 374
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have powerful allies in the local landowners who hope to sell off their
holdings. Communities resigned to rapid growth, and aware that they
cannot force small-tract developers to dedicate lands for schools and
parks, have imposed subdivision fees varying with the number of
lots in a project. Increasingly, courts are willing to uphold such exac-
tions only when the local government can prove that the additional
community facilities for which the fees are assessed are uniquely at-
tributable to the developer's project.14 Even in states where the courts
allow the most liberal evidentiary standard for proving that a partic-
ular project has generated the need for a certain park or school, local
governments rarely force small-tract developments to pay their own
way in social services.15 Most of these expenses a large-tract builder
bears without question.
Of course, the size of a project is no assurance of quality; huge devel-
opments may be poorly planned and niggardly in yielding space for
public uses. But the guilty large builders usually share the charac-
teristic small builder's plight of undercapitalization. Such a developer
borrows heavily, at high interest rates-usually one per cent or more
a month.' 6 His pressing loan repayment schedule is likely to prevent
him from allotting planners and architects enough time to conceive
and prepare careful plans, from experimenting with novel construction
techniques, or from arranging land uses in unusual layouts for un-
tested markets11
Mich. 622, 132 N.W.2d 687 (1965) (divided court upholding a graduated lot-size ordinance
which imposed acreage minimums ranging from 7200 to 20,000 square feet).
14. E.g., Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 22 111. 2d 375, 380,
176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961).
15. See e.g., Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 621, 137 N.W.2d
442, 449 (1965):
the approval of the instant and other subdivision plats . . . has required defendant
village and the encompassing school districts to expend large sums for acquisition
of park and school lands and construction of additional school facilities . . . made
necessary by the influx of people into these subdivisions . . . and . . . these ex-
penditures are greater than the amount which has been exacted from the subdividers
by way of land dedication and equalization fees paid in lieu of land dedication.
16. Interview With Robert Barclay, Barclay, Hollander & Curci Co., Los Angeles,
Calif., Aug. 4, 1966; SmiTH, Tim Low-Risa SPECULATIVE APARTMENT 48-61 (Institute of
Urban and Regional Development, University of California, Berkeley, Research Report
25, 1964); during the fourth quarter of 1965 state chartered savings associations In Call-
fornia reported yields on construction loans ranging from a minimum of 13.50% to a
maximum of 16.80%. State of California, Division of Savings and Loan, Department of
Investment, Statistical Release No. 66-1, June 17, 1966, p. 3.
17. See, e.g., HEzoG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 22-24; Glikbarg, Financing Residential
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The competition of large, well-financed developers may eventually
drive out small and undercapitalized builders. Each year more pri-
vately developed new towns and planned residential communities are
built 8 while the number of small builders declines.' 0 Yet there are
Development, in CAiFORNIA LAND SEcuRr AND DmmLOP.%mNT 537-39 (California Practice
Handbook No. 14, 1960).
18. New Towns for America, House and Home Magazine, Feb. 1964, p. 121; Where
City Planners Come Down to Earth, Business Week, Aug. 20, 1966, p. 100.
19. According to the Bureau of Census, only 60% of all starts in 1964 of single.family
non-farm residential structures were merchant built and intended for sale. The re-
maining 40% were owner initiated or owner built. 1965 FAcr Boor 38-42. One authority
estimated that, in 1949, builders of more than 100 houses a year accounted for about
24% of the total volume of housing starts. MmSF.L, HousEUtnLDur iN TwANsmon 292
(1953). An NAHB survey estimated that the figure had climbed to 64% by 1959. NAH,
The Home Builder-What Does He Build?, Journal of Homebuilding, March, 1960. p. 26.
A study of the building industry in Northern California registered 62% and 74% in 1959
and 1960. HzRzoG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 21. During the first quarter of 1959, a study
by the Bureau of Building Marketing Research revealed size of output as illustrated in
the chart below:
NotmEm AND PzR CENT OF Bum.nms, By Sum OF Acrrvrr, UNrrm STATES, 1959
Number of Per Cent
Size Builders Distribution
1. Small













$1,000,000 +) 103 12.8
6. Unclassified 24 3.0
804 100.0
BUREAU OF BUIDING MAREO NG RESEARCH, MAREING AND REsEARcit PAn.,, IST. REPORT
(1959). The share of output of large builders as represented in the chart is somewhat
larger than suggested by the U.S. Department of Labor reports, U.S. BUEmu OF LABOR
STATXsTCS, DP'Tr OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1170, STRucruR OF Tim REsDEN-TL But.ING IN-
DusTRY iN 1949 (1954); see also MEYERSON, TmuzrR & WHEATON, HousIN, PEOPL. AND
Crrms 105-07 (1962). These sources are representative of virtually all recent studies of
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still few experienced real estate investors who possess the funds to
develop large-scale projects.2 And loans in normal capital markets
output, and they are disappointingly consistent. The builder of 100 units typically
produces two to four tracts of five to fifteen acres a year. Interview With John Malone,
Field Service Director, Homebuilders Association, Aug. 15, 1966. Herzog has summarized
the situation:
ihe tendency of the industry to move toward a more oligopolistic structure re-
mains no more than a tendency. Even the changes which took place between 1950
and 1960 were not sufficient to remove the industry from the competitive (as op-
posed to the oligopolistic) class. In 1960, for example, the four largest northern
California firms accounted for only about 11 per cent of the total housebuilding in
that area. The eight largest built only 22 per cent, and even the 20 largest could
garner no more than 35 per cent of the market. Those percentages (concentration
ratios) are well below those found in most other industrial sectors of the economy.
Only in the service and distribution trades, and in about 15 per cent of the manu-
facturing industries (representing about 20 per cent of manufacturing output) can
one find lower ratios.
HERZOG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 27.
20. Constructing an experiment in urban or suburban environment, even on a
limited scale, is costly. For example, San Ramon Village, a new community in Northern
California, is a $250 million, 4,500 acre development. One California association which
participated heavily in development financing currently accounts a gross financing
package of $45 million. Letter From Patrick H. Price, Vice President, San Francisco
Federal Savings and Loan Association, July 15, 1966. Even mixed use projects ordinarily
require a minimum of 400-500 acres of land costing, typically, $5,000,000. A developer
with abundant financial backing would still have to invest between $1,000,000 and
$2,000,000 of his own funds in such a venture. In Southern California there are fewer
than thirty who could afford the price. Interview With Sid Carnine, Aiscot Develop.
ment Co., La Puente, Calif., Aug. 7, 1966. Urban renewal programs, public or private,
are the most expensive of all. An example is Alcoa's Century City in Los Angeles which,
partially completed, has cost $293 million. See Where City Planners Come Down to
Earth, supra note 18, at 102.
Real estate, a mainstay of the U.S. economy, especially in the post-war years, Is
perhaps the most neglected alternative among equity choices open to institutional
investors [life insurance companies, pension funds, colleges and universities]. Since
1945 the value of this nation's land has almost tripled, to around 360 billion, while
the value of buildings has more than tripled. Yet, in spite of real estate's substantial
contribution to the national wealth, there is a reluctance on the part of many in-
stitutions to share in the rewards of real estate investment. Why do these inter-
mediaries so often wear blinders when approaching this vigorous section of the
economy? A number of explanations might be advanced. Certainly there is a paucity
of information concerning the evaluation of return on real estate and the suitability
of real estate as a component of institutional portfolios. On top of this there is the
problem faced by many institutions of acquiring the investment techniques and
the skills necessary in handling the web of regulatory authority restrictions sur-
rounding largescale real estate transactions.
RicKs, RECENT TRENDS IN INSTITUTIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT 1 (Institute of Urban and
Regional Development, University of California, Berkeley, Research Report 23, 1964).
Of the two barriers to real estate investment mentioned by Ricks, only one-legal re-
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remain readily available for small and undercapitalized development.
Thus undercapitalized builders working on small tracts are likely to
remain an important element in the construction industry.
DEviCEs FOR CONTAINING UNDERCAPrrALIZED CONSTRUCTION
Impatient with the pace at which new towns and planned communi-
ties are replacing small tracts, planners public and private have sought
new means of shaping land development. They have lauded the
English and Scandinavian new towns as superior efforts to realize the
benefits of planning and development in large parcels. But Congress
has shown little interest in similar direct government programs here.21
State laws could be written to require licenses and exorbitant bonds of
land developers, in effect outlawing undercapitalized builders. The
history of contractor licensing laws, however, suggests that the industry
to be licensed tends to set licensing standards and dominate the ad-
ministration of the laws, usually to preserve the status of existing
licensees, discourage newcomers, and minimize price competition.2
traints-applies to savings associations, as association management is daily engaged in
appraising real estate investment returns.
21. Among the most ambitious proposals was S. 1354 to provide federal aid for the
purchase of remote tracts by state land development agencies which were then to lay
out entire new cities, and sell the land to private developers subject to planning and
use controls. S. 1354, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 604 (1965). See also, Gom-oR's ADvtSORY
COSMeISSlON ON HOUSING PROBLEMS, REPORT ON HOUSING IN C~uiroRNz 54 (1963). Its
failure evidences Congressional reluctance to support direct government entry into the
land development business. See Hearings on S. 1354 Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong.. Ist Sess. (1965). A similar
rationale accounts for the defeat of H.R. 7500, a bill designed primarily to promote the
orderly conversion of agricultural lands to suburban development through a priate
profit-making corporation which would be responsible for the acquisition of large tracts
within five miles of existing urban centers and would eventually sell its holdings to
developers. H.R. 7500, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101-307 (1965). See Hearings on H.R. 7500
Before the Subcommittee on Conservation and Credit of the House Committee on Agri-
culture, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1965). To date the only types of "planning and de-
velopment" measures to achieve adoption are those which provide planning grants, see
68 Stat. 640 (1954), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 461(a)-(f) (1964), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 461
(a), (b), (g) (Supp. I, 1965) or financing for utilities and similar traditionally public
improvements to local governments, see Housing and Urban Development Act of 1963
§ 701, 79 Stat. 489 (1965), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3101-08 (Supp. 1, 1965), and which insure the
mortgages of private developers for land acquisition and planning costs (Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1965 § 201(a), 79 Stat. 461 (1965), 12 U.S.C. § 1749aa174911
(Supp. I, 1965).
22. See Edwards, Legal Requirements that Building Contractors Be Licensed, 12 LAv &
CoCNTEmp. PROB. 76 (1947); Comment, Mechanics Liens and Surety Bonds in the Building
Trades, 68 YALE L.J. 138 (1958). Political and constitutional feasibility aside, the desir-
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There is no reason to expect a different result from the licensing of
land developers.2a Subdivision regulations and zoning are ineffectual
at substituting large projects for small. They encounter political and
constitutional barriers, 24 the public planners' view of the proper
bounds of his authority,25 and the physical and economic limits of
small sites.
26
Although the federal mortgage insurance program probably has re-
sulted in better suburban land development, 27 the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) cannot by itself eliminate the blight of under-
capitalized building. Since its inception the FHA has drafted model
land use control legislation for local governments, imposed site and
building design standards as prerequisites for insurance, and provided
ability of allowing only the well-capitalized to build houses is questionable. See notes
89 and 90 infra and accompanying text.
23. Subdividers must obtain licenses in some states but the major purpose of such laws
is to discourage fraudulent land sales. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ch. 118, art. 16 (1963).
24. See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 12, at 1122.
25. The planning fraternity is not committed to the theory that the public sector ought
to dictate spatial arrangements. While many concur with Charles Haar that "The aim of
planning may be to eliminate the inefficiencies of the market mechanism," few are prepared
to attempt to alter the basic structure of housebuilding. Haar, The Social Control of Urban
Space, in CrMs AND SPACE 175, 200 (Wingo ed. 1963). Professor Dunham has rather
aptly expressed the position for restraining the scope of planners' authority:
A refusal to approve a subdivision because the planners prefer a "Radburn" type of
lay-out to that proposed by the private developer would be comparable to an order
of the Federal Trade Commission preventing automobile companies from marketing
a car with a two-tone color scheme because it believed the public would so quickly
tire of the style that there would be accelerated obsolescence. In street planning terms,
the plan commission ought to concern itself with design and lay-out of the sub-
division only where the development as proposed will adversely affect neighboring
properties.
Dunham, City Planning: An Analysis of the Content of the Master Plan, 1 J. LAW 9& ECON.
170, 185-86 (1958). Even when planners seek affirmatively to shape the urban environment,
the demands of time and the pragmatics of development force them to concentrate their
limited resources in the large projects.
26. As the court in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, supra note 15, at 622, 187
N.W.2d at 449-50, explained:
Where a comparatively small tract of land is subdivided,.., and there Is no adjoining
land already devoted to school, park, or playground purposes to which a portion of
the proposed subdivision might be attached, it usually would be impracticable to
require dedication of any land of the subdivision. The two alternatives are either to
relieve the subdivider from any obligation whatever in this direction, or to require
payment of an equalization fee ....
27. "As much as we malign the FHA they make even architects observe some standards
which the architects otherwise might not have observed.... I think they've done a great
deal to improve the standards for say the tract house." Demars, Using Routine Procedures
to Create a Varied City in THE NEw RENEWAL 41, 59 (Duggar ed. 1961).
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developers with planning advice.2 8 Until recently, however, mortgage
insurance was available only in completed projects to homebuyers. To
acquire land and plan the site the developer had to use funds which
he did not recapture from FHA mortgage proceeds and down pay-
ments until after his houses were sold. Therefore, even with an FHA
commitment to insure home mortgages, the undercapitalized builder
needed to minimize site planning and land costs. In 1965 Congress
extended insurance coverage to mortgages for land acquisition and
site planning costs.29 The impact of this legislation will be limited,
however, by the amount of insurance the FHA is willing to issue under
the new program 0 and its interest and discount rate ceilings.31 The
maximum FHA rate is customarily lower than the going rate
charged by savings associations,32 where small builders usually have to
go for their front money. Of all mortgages written on new homes in
the United States in 1964, only 22% were FHA insured;33 and rela-
tively few of these were obtained by small builders,34 who are deterred
28. See, e.g., HHFA, 1964 ANNUAL REPORT 123 (1965). An example of the FHM's role
in shaping model zoning laws for local governments is described in Hanke, Planned Unit
Development and Land Use Intensity, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 15 (1965) (discussing the FHA's
Model Land Use Intensity Standards). However, the FHA has often supported and some-
times coerced monotonous uniformity in order to promote short-term savings in construc-
tion costs.
29. The FHA insures first mortgages ("'first mortgage' includes such classes of liens as
are commonly given to secure advances [including but not limited to advances during
construction] on, or the unpaid purchase price of real estate ... together with the credit
instrument or instruments, if any, secured thereby .... ') for land development ("land
development' means the process of making, installing, or constructing improvements," but
improvements "shall not include any building.') Housing and Urban Development Act
of 1956 § 201(a), 79 Stat. 461 (1965), 12 U.S.C. 1749aa-174911 (Supp. I 1965).
30. 30 Fed. Reg. 15035 (1965), 24 C.F.R. §§ 1000.47-.55 (1966).
31. 30 Fed. Reg. 15034-55 (1965), 12 C.F.R. §§ 1000.25, .35, .50 (1966).
32. The current FHA maximum rate is 54% plus V% insurance premium while the
going rate for long term financing in Southern California is 8%.
53. HHFA, 1964 ANNUAL REPORT 74 (1965).
34.
VARIATIONS IN FHA-VA HoUSING STARRTS FOR NoRTERN
CALIFORNIA AND UNITED STATEs-1956-60
Northern FHA Starts VA Starts in Total FHA-VA
California in Northern Northern Starts in
1-Family California California Northern
Year Starts (Ist Inspection) (Ist Inspection) California
1956 38,600 17,414 10,868 28282
1957 31,500 12,983 5,942 18.925
1958 36,227 22,215 3,435 26,650
1959 46,663 24,967 3,666 28,633
1960 35,766 18,974 3,034 22.008
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by the costs of processing an FHA application, the discounts at
which low interest FHA insured mortgages must be sold in tight
money markets, and the reluctance of savings associations to write
FHA insured loans. In 1964, for example, less than 5% of savings
associations' mortgages were FHA insured. 3r FHA programs tend,
consequently, to be ineffectual at altering the development practices
of small producers.
THE PRESENT ROLE OF SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS IN LAND DEVELOPMENT
Developers depend on institutional lenders for most of their funds
and only acquire land for which lenders are willing to supply construc-
tion loans. Yet rarely have those concerned with the quality of subur-
ban land development attempted to restrain the undercapitalized
builder by acting directly on his indispensable accomplice. 0





Large-Scale VA-FHA Starts from Starts from
FHA-VA as Per Cent Previous Previous
Starts in of Total Year in Year in
Northern FHA-VA Northern Northern
California Starts California California
1956 25,202 89 -38 -18
1957 19,555 103 -33 -23
1958 23,632 87 +41 +21
1959 24,303 85 + 8 + 3
1960 21,619 98 -23 -11
Source: HERZOG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 44.
35. Cf. HERZOG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 40-46.
36. The problem has apparently been one of low visibility. The existence of the
relationship other than for purposes of historical analysis has seldom even been acknowl-
edged. See COLEAN, THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT ON REAL ESTATE FINANCE IN TIlE UNITED
STATES 75 (1950). Among the exceptions are presentations which appear regularly In trade
publications advocating such practices as varied densities, open space, and so on. Norman
Strunk, executive vice president of the United States Savings and Loan League, has
explained that "In the main, I think our people regard our role as a financial intermediary
and are probably not as significant in the decision as to the public use of land as they
might well be." Letter From Norman Strunk, July 27, 1966. The League is attempting to
inculcate awareness through such devices as the booklets on Land Planning (1962) and
Design (1963) which appear in the UNITED STATES SAVINGS & LOAN LEAGUE, CONSTRUcTION
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Of all the suppliers of capital for residential real estate in the United
States,37 savings associations are the most important,38 holding 44.1%
LENDING GumF& Among the other exceptions are a rather desultory reference in Govnuoa's
ADVISORy COMM'N ON HoUsING, REPORT ON HOUSING IN CAuFoRNta appendix, at 328 (1963))
and Comment, The Savings and Loan Association Industry and Multi.Family "Home"
Development, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 594 (1965).
37. The following chart illustrates the total market shares of mortgage lenders in
1-4 family non-farm homes, 1963 and 1964.
Dollars are in billions (All Loans )
1964 1963 Net Increase
Type of Holder Amount Per Cent Amount Per Cent in 1954
Saving and Loan $87.1 44.1 $79.4 43.6 7.7
Association
Life Insurance 28.7 14.5 27.3 15.0 1.4
Companies
Commercial Banks 27.2 13.8 24.9 13.7 2.3
Mutual Savings Banks 27.4 13.9 24.7 13.6 2.7
Federal Credit 6.0 3.0 6.2 13.4 (-_)
Agencies
State and Local 2.2 1.1 2.1 1.2 .
Government
Pension Funds, 1.6 .8 1.2 0.7 .4
Credit Unions
Mortgage Companies 33 1.7 3.0 1.6 .3
Other Holders 14.2 7.2 13.4 7.2 .8
Total 197.7 100 182.2 100 15.5
Source: HHFA, 1964 ANNUAL REPORT 43 (1965).
38. See 1965 FAct Boor 65. Savings associations financed approximately 442,000 dwellings
in 1964 or 29% of all housing starts. The proportion of private starts financed by assoda-
tions since 1955 has ranged between 25% and 31%. As other institutional lenders are not
required to segregate disbursements by purpose of loan, comparative figures are not
available. The statistical series which reported the total volume of residential mortgage
financing until the end of 1964 was compiled by the FHLBBs Operation Analysis
Division. Omission of loans above $20,000 was purportedly offset by the inclusion of
an approximately equal amount of loans on property other than residential mortgages.
The following example for 1964 is the result of HHFA's correlation of FHLBB data with
that of other federal agencies.
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of all non-farm residential mortgage debt.39 The associations provide
about seven billion dollars annually for new construction, and about
ten billion dollars for home purchase financing. Most of the industry's
assets-about 130 billion dollars-are in real estate mortgages, more
than 86% of which are on one- to four-unit structures.40
Savings and loan associations are bound by market forces and legal
restraints41 to place their vast resources in mortgage loans for specula-
39. 1964 LOANS-NUMBER, AMOUNT, PERCENTAGE, DISTRIBUTION, AND TYPE OF FINANCING Or
Non Farm MORTGAGE RECORDINGS OF $20,000 OR LESS
Type of Mortgagee
Mutual
Savings Insurance Commercial Savings Sub-
& Loan Company Bank Bank Total
Number
(in thousands) 1450 109 739 193 632
Amount
(in millions
of dollars) 15759 1408 6656 2182 3528
Number
(per cent) 37 3 19 5 16
Amount





Misc. Total Loan Loans Loans
Number
(in thousands) 770 3893 503 186 5204
Amount
(in millions
of dollars) 7588 36921 6573 2851 27497
Number
(per cent) 20 100 13 5 82
Amount
(per cent) 20 100 18 8 74
Source: HHFA, 1964 ANNUAL REPORT 418-19 (1965).
40. UNITED STATES SAVINGS AND LOAN LEAGUE, 1964 SAVINGS AND LOAN FACT Boot 93.94
(1964). 1964 figures have been generally used in the study because complete data for that
year is available from such sources as the FHLBB and the HHFA.
41. The controlling federal statute provides that federal associations shall lend ou
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tive, undercapitalized enterprises. To compete with commercial banks
for depositors, savings associations typically pay interest rates more
than one-half per cent in excess of the commercial bank rate.42 They
charge borrowers higher interest rates and make loans at greater loan-
to-value ratios. 3 As a result, savings associations attract freshman
mortgages, primarily on residential real property of less than five units. Home Owners'
Loan Act of 1933 § 5(c), 48 Stat. 132 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1964). as
amended 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (Supp. I, 1965). The FHLBB further limits statutory invest-
ment powers through regulations such as 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-7 (1966), which pares down the
statutorily permissible investment in multiple unit dwellings. Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) regulations add another dimension by requiring that no
more than 10% of withdrawable accounts may be lent to a single borrower unless aggre-
gate loans to that borrower are less than $100,000. 28 Fed. Reg. 16209 (Feb. 21, 1963), 12
C.F.R. § 563.9-3 (1966). The average association at the dose of 1964 had assets of 19.1
million. 1965 FAcr BooK 87. Supplementing all of these restrictions is the Internal Revenue
Code which limits the liberal bad debt deduction of associations if more than 36% of
assets are placed in other than specified investments-mostly residential development of
less than five units. See note 80 infra.
42.





Savings & Mutual in US. State & Corpo-
Loan Savings Commercial Govt Local rate
Year Assoc. Banks Banks Bonds Bonds Bonds
1930 5.3 % 4.5 % 3.9 % 3.3 % 4.1% 4.5 %
1935 3.1 2.7 2.6 2.7 3.4 3.6
1940 3.3 2.0 1.3 2.2 2.5 2.8
1945 2.5 1.7 0.8 2.4 1.7 2.5
1950 2.5 1.9 0.9 2.3 2.0 2.6
1955 2.9 2.6 1.4 2.8 2.6 3.1
1960 3.86 3.47 2.56 4.01 3.69 4AI
1964 4.190 4.10 3.47 4.15 3.28 4AO
Source: 1965 FAcT BooK 16.
0 Estimated.
The opinion is widely held and thoroughly documented in the savings and loan industry
that a spread of one-half of I per cent between dividends paid by savings and loan asocia-
tions and the savings rates paid by commercial banks is necessary to attract suflicient
investment for savings and loan growth to keep pace with the demands of the mortgage
markets. See UNrrED STATES SAvrNcs AND LOAN LEAGUE, SAvINGS AND LoN ANNAts 152-72
(1958); Hearings on The Treasury Department Report on Taxation of Mutual Savings
Banks and Savings and Loan Associations Before The House Committee on Ways and
Means, 87 Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1961).
43. Savings associations mortgages tend to be on more modest properties, have higher
loan to value ratios, and cost more in interest and fees. In 1964 savings associations took
legal or distress actions against 0.53% of their borrowers as compared with 0.A6% for all
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builders unable to obtain funds from commercial banks or insurance
companies. 44 Ordinarily, they encounter an established developer only
when he wants to retrieve the capital he has invested in a project. The
larger developer who is a good credit risk generally obtains funding
from banks and insurance companies even for his unconventional
ventures. When he borrows from a savings association, he is usually
seeking to recapture the capital he has invested in a completed project
from mortgage proceeds-hardly the situation in which he considers
the potential long term yield which sound planning might generate.
Since savings associations finance high risk ventures in exchange
for high interest rates, they might also be expected to finance novel
land developments as they sometimes do for small developers .4  But
lenders. 1965 FACr BOOK 77. A high percentage of these foreclosures are on short-term
construction loans. See FHLBB, 1964 ANNUAL REPORT 11 (1965). The riskiness of construction
loans is evidenced by high interest and fees. While we are unaware of any national figures
on this subject, the statistical release published by the California Savings and Loan
Commissioner indicates the true cost of money. For example, during the fourth quarter of
1965 state chartered associations in California enjoyed the following effective annual yields
on new loans:
Construction Loans Non-construction Loans
Maximum Yield Minimum Yield Effective Yield
(weighted average) (weighted average) (weighted average)
16.80 13.50 6.59
Source: State of California, Division of Savings and Loan, Department of Investment,
Statistical Release No. 66-1, June 27, 1966, p. 3.
These figures probably do not reflect the national average, as California contract interest
rates have been 2 to 2 points higher than in large eastern cities. Charges for commissions,
premiums, and fees far exceed the national average. GovaRNOR's ADvlsORY Co1M'"N ON
HOUSING PROBLEMS, op. cit. supra note 36, at 21. California statistics are particularly im-
portant; savings and loan assets in California are the largest in the nation-over $23
billion. Illinois follows with $10,517,000,000, Ohio with $9,144,000,000 and New York with
$7,370,000,000. 1965 FACT BOOK 81.
44. See note 2 supra.
45. An example is the Oakland developer of low-rise speculative apartment houses
who decided to install light weight metal fireplaces. Commercial banks and insurance
companies, uncertain of the market for such an amenity, denied him financing. He was
compelled to pay the higher savings association rate for his first projects. The fireplaces
were well received and the developer now obtains his loans from banks and insurance
companies. The large developer who is a good credit risk ordinarily obtains funding from
banks and insurance companies even for his unconventional ventures. When he borrows
from a savings association, it is usually because he seeks liquidity, and liquidity is gener-
ally incompatible with experimental land development. The heavier the debt service costs,
the less likely is a developer to experiment with new housing forms and to make long-term
real estate investments. The Oakland apartment house developer is an exception; the
builder who cannot obtain a favorable loan for his inventive enterprises usually modifies
his plans to suit the conservative lender. Risse, The Influence of Institutional Lenders
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usually the risk is provided, not by a novel construction technique,
but by the builder's low credit rating, the uncertainty of the housing
market or a high loan-to-value ratio. Once a builder obtains a loan
from a savings association, he faces heavy debt service costs which re-
quire a fast return on his investment. This is a further deterrent to
experimentation.
Only infrequently do savings associations lend money for urban
renewal projects46 and new towns or large planned communities.4 7
Such investments have traditionally required larger outlays than
small associations can afford if they are to maintain portfolio diversity.
This barrier is of decreasing importance because associations have
been growing rapidly. Between 1954 and 1964, while the number of
associations increased only slightly, their assets grew from $20,000-
000,000 to $120,000,000,000.
48
The second reason that savings associations have not participated
heavily in prime large-scale development is that mortgage yields are
higher on speculative, conventional housing.40 But direct investors in
predeveloped land, owners of commercial property such as shopping
centers, and developers of large-scale planned communities have real-
upon Apartment House Development 18-20, 1965 (unpublished paper in the University
of Southern California Law Library).
46. Interview With Russell C. Chase, President, Marina Federal Savings and Loan
Association, Los Angeles, Calif., May 11, 1966.
47. Home Savings and Loan Association, the largest state-chartered association in Cali.
fornia, is a new town developer, thus exercising its statutory prerogative to invest in land
development. New Towns for America, House and Home Magazine, Feb., 1964, p. 121. Of
the 75 new towns which should be completed by 1985, only one appears to be sponsored
by a savings association. Norman Strunk, Executive Vice-President, United States Savings
and Loan League, suggests the reason: " . .legal authority to invest major amounts in
land is too limited to permit our business to be very active in the phase of community
development." Letter, July 7, 1966. The need for additional funds for new town develop-
ment is described in Hearings on S. 1354, supra note 21, at 44-45; Hearings on Proposed
Housing Legislation for 1966 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banting
and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966). See also, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 14, 1966,
§ J, p. 1, col. 1.
48. UNrr STATES SAvinGs AND LOAN LEAGUE, 1955 SAVINGS AND Lo.A.4 FAct Boon 39-40
(1955); 1965 FACT Boon 87. In 1954, there were 6,030 associations; in 1966, there were
6,248. 20.97 of all associations have assets under $1 million; another 43.1% have assets
under $10 million. On the other hand, of the 6,248 associations operating in 1964, 1,011
had assets in excess of $25 million. 1965 FACT Boor 87.
49. Large sums in a single venture effect considerable savings for both lender and
borrower. The conventional insurance company investor currently wants a 6-y% yield.
Depending on the credit standing of the borrower, this can and often does result in rates
as low as 6-V% on both construction and long term mortgages. Interview With Richard
Chew, Manager of Mortgage Loan Department, Coldwell Banker & Co., Los Angeles,
Calif., Aug. 4, 1966. This is considerably lower than the average going savings and loan
rate.
1966] 1287
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ized greater returns than savings associations.5° If allowed to invest
directly in land developments, savings associations would be likely
to shift some of their funds from mortgages to reap these gains.
LENDING RESTRICTIONS
The public regulations which govern savings associations impose
the concerns of the past on an industry1 whose finance needs and
practices have changed radically. Savings associations were started
during the industrial revolution as mutual aid societies by workmen
who pooled their savings to provide one another with funds for build-
ing a home.52 These mutual aid origins account for peculiar rules that
in some states give depositors the title of "stockholders"-althougli
the association is in fact controlled by the owners of its publicly traded
shares.53 New savers in federally chartered associations are surprised
to learn that they are owners when they receive their first proxy form.
Actually, control of federal associations is divided between manage-
ment and federal regulators.54 This nominal mutuality has remained
a part of the industry's public image and makes the proposal that as-
sociations become land developers seem radical indeed. But in practice
savings associations are already professional lending companies, bear-
50. In the past decade, land in the United States has appreciated at the rate of 10%
per annum. What about Real Estate as an Investment Now, U.S. News and World Report,
June 20, 1966. In California, the average over a similar span has been 18% per annum.
Interview With Kent Williams, Property Research, Los Angeles, Calif., July 5, 1966. Since
1956, yields on successful shopping centers have ranged from 8 to 15%. Interview With
Walter Clark, Senior Loan Officer, Security First National Bank, Los Angeles, Calif., Aug.
14, 1966. There are no collected figures on returns on large-scale planned communities.
However, a recent study by the NAHB indicates that the average builder receives 8%1 to
10%. Interview With John Malone, supra note 19. With scale economies, this percentage
tends to rise. HERZOG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 22-27.
51. The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC) were designed to inject needed money into the reeling mortgage
market. See Hearings on S. 2959 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 44-53 (1932). Its purposes, as specified in the Home
Owner's Loan Act of 1933, are "to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which people
may invest their funds and in order to provide for the financing of homes .... " 48 Stat.
132 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1964).
In 1964, 76% of all associations, holding 96% of total industry assets, were insured by
FSLIC. 1965 FAcr BOOK 122. Massachusetts, Ohio and Maryland provide insurance at the
State level. Id. at 84-85. 79.8% of all associations holding 98A% of all assets were mem-
bers of the FHLB system. Id. at 111-12.
52. See, e.g., HOAGLAND & STONE, REAL ESTATE FINANCE 192-96 (1965).
53. E.g., CAL. FiN. CODE § 5062.
54. 1965 FACT BOOK 109-10. Associations with federal charters numbered 1981, or 81.7%
of all associations at the dose of 1964. Their total resources then amounted to $61.6 billion,
or 51.7% of total assets of the savings and loan industry. Id. at 83.
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ing scarce resemblance to groups of workmen in a pub sharing half
crowns and ale.
Associations are required to place most of their assets in mortgages
on single-family dwellings. This made sense in the 1930's when single-
family homes, constructed by small builders, were the dominant
pattern. At the time the average home builder was constructing fewer
than four houses a year on single parcels or lots in small, unplanned
subdivisions.55 Large-scale developments, on the other hand, were a
hangover from the disastrous real estate boom. In the early years of the
century there had been along mass transit routes scattered large-scale
subdivisions which had been poorly designed; and in the 1920's and
1930's many had failed, leaving suburban communities with unredeem-
able expenditures for abandoned streets and utilities.0 It seemed
only good sense for Congress to ignore the financing needs of the large
development. Today, however, the big developer is responsible for
most of what is imaginative and well-planned in residential housing,
and the laws that divert savings association funds away from large
developments make poor public policy.
Congress also worked on the assumption that no one but the associa-
tion would advance home loans. Thirty years ago short term mortgages
based on a 50% loan-to-value ratio seemed daring and ample, and
commercial banks and other institutional lenders treated them as
unsound high-risk investments. 7 With increased job security for
middle income wage earners, FHA mortgage insurance, and the Fed-
eral National Mortgage Association's (FNMA) secondary market opera-
tions, home loans have become acceptable risks for even the most
conservative lenders. Today, commercial banks are making home and
construction loans on terms that would have astounded the New Deal
architects of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system and the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).rs
55. According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics study of 1938, the average builder of
single family dwellings constructed only 3.5 houses a year. Only about one-fourth of the
builders produced as many as the average. Of the twenty-eight cities in the BLS Survey
with populations of 100,000 or more, thirteen did not have a builder who constructed
twenty-five houses a year. CoLEAN, AMEFuIcAN HousING, PRO3LEMS AND PRospEtrs 75 (1944).
56. See, e.g., CoRNIuci, PamIAmTUR SUBDIVISION AND ITS CONSEQUzCEcS 1-21 (1938).
57. See Hearings on S. 2959, supra note 51, at 29-32. See also CoL.,my, op. cit. supra
note 36, at 44-47, 51-62.
58. National Banks are currently permitted to make 25 year loans up to 80% of value
provided that the principal is fully amortized during the term. 38 Stat. 273 (1913), as
amended, 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 371 (Supp. I, 1965). Amendments
to the Banking Act enacted in 1935 as part of the effort to increase funds for mortgage-
lending permitted national banks to make 10 year loans up to 60% of value, provided
1966] 1289
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Preempted in this market by other institutions and prevented by
law from making substantial direct investments, the savings associa-
tions have had to make mortgage loans which approach the full value
of the property. In the volatile real estate market savings associations
are making home mortgage loans at 90% of value for 30 years, with-
out the benefit of FHA mortgage insurance, and even in states where
mortgage foreclosure costs may equal 10% of the value of the security.0
Developers large and small turn to savings associations when they
seek to "cash out," i.e., to obtain a loan appraisal based on the fair
market value of the completed project which exceeds actual costs,
thus returning to the project sponsor his invested capital. 0 Even with
a 70% loan-to-value ratio, the savings association may have the only
capital at risk in a speculative apartment house or tract.01 If the land
values rise, the worth of the developer's equity increases, and he pays
off the mortgage debt. When values decline, he defaults. In many states
with substantial savings association activity, anti-deficiency judgment
statutes bar mortgagees from recovering against debtors personally
should the property bring a price at foreclosure inadequate to satisfy
the debt.62 Thus while savings associations may suffer heavily in bad
times, they profit only modestly from land inflation, despite the risks
they take.
State and federal associations are allowed to make limited invest-
ments in real estate under a variety of laws. They are usually per-
that at least 40% of the loan was amortized during the term. Banking Act of 195, ch.
614, 49 Stat. 706-07 (1935).
59. Cf. Prather, A Realistic Approach to Foreclosure, 14 Bus. LAW 132 (1958).
60. See, e.g., SmiTH, op. cit. supra note 16, at 48-52, 59-62.
61. To say that savings associations are taking the risks which we ordinarily assign as
"equity" risk is not to imply that apartment house or tract developers are receiving un-
deserved gains. As Wallace F. Smith contends:
It has been customary to disguise the earnings of the real estate entrepreneur as a
return on equity investment. If high loan ratios seem to indicate that mortgage lend-
ers are providing equity capital as well, they do not mean that lenders are performing
entrepreneurial functions. Our argument has been that the input of entrepreneur-
ship is a separate component of value and a necessary ingredient in a healthy real
estate economy.
Id. at 95.
This is a compensable input and "it is the ultimate value of the package of resources,
not their initial costs, which should govern long-term lending or investing decisions."
Id. at 89. See also Hearings on HiR. 5840 Before the Subcommittee on Housing of the
House Banking and Currency Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 413 (Statement of Arthur
Padula, Builder). See also Elias & Gillies, Some Observations on the Role of Speculators
and Speculation in Land Development, 12 U.C.LA. L. REv. 789 (1965).
62. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(b); Hetland, Deficiency Judgment Limitations
in California-A New Judicial Approach, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1963).
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mitted to own the office buildings which they occupy, even if substan-
tial space is leased to others.63 From state to state such acquisitions may
not exceed fixed percentages of, variously, reserves, assets, surplus ac-
counts, or paid-in savings liability. Everywhere associations are au-
thorized to acquire, manage and develop foreclosed property for
resale. 64 But only thirteen states allow associations to purchase and
develop land,6 5 and this investment prerogative is denied altogether
to federally chartered institutions.06 Even in the thirteen permissive
states land investment is limited to paltry percentages of an associa-
tion's total assets.
67
While federal associations lack the authority to invest in suburban
land, they may place up to two per cent of their assets "in interests
in real property located within urban renewal areas."0s But urban
renewal equities have little attraction for federal associations. With
enormous capital outlays the success of an urban renewal construc-
tion job depends on what happens to the buildings around it. Federal
and state urban renewal procedures are time consuming, intricate,
and often infuriating to the sponsor. Savings association management
is unfamiliar with real estate values in typical renewal areas, and
it is yet to be demonstrated that equity holdings in urban renewal
projects are profitable.6 9 With the exception of urban renewal, savings
associations have invested in real estate whenever possible.
70
63. E.g., ILL. RFv. STAT. ch. 82, § '799. See generally, lVeela, Statutory Investment Powers
of State Savings Associations, 50 LEGAL BuLL-nN 189, 202 (1964).
64. E.g., ILT. Rv. STAT. dh. 32 § 79 2(g); Weeks, supra note 63, at 207.
65. See note 5 supra.
66. Interview With Orvil Fassett, Federal Home Loan Bank, Los Angeles, Cal., Aug. 8,
1966.
67. The California statute set out in the text at p. 15 is typical. The range seldom
exceeds 10%. See Weeks, supra note 63.
68. 48 Stat. 132 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. 1464(c) (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(c) (Supp. I, 1965).
69. Interview with Russell C. Chase, supra note 46. The same problems discouraged
life insurance companies and New York mutual savings banks from investing in urban
renewal equities after a few had entered the field. See CoEwtA, RENEWING OMt CmEs 91-
94 (1953). Colean lists other reasons for the withdrawal of life insurance companies and
mutual savings banks. Some local authorities, although not required by federal law, sought
commitments prior to land assembly and clearance. "In effect, this made the investor the
sponsor of the whole undertaking and subjected him to public criticism, interminable
negotiations with local authorities, long delays, and the consequent loss of income on
committed funds over what might be a period of several years." Id. at 92-93. See also
AmtAs, Tm Crry is T FRoNTI 95-98 (1965) (describing the difficulties of Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company in developing Stuyvesant Town).
70. See, e.g., State of California, Division of Savings and Loan, Statistical Release No.
66-1, June 27, 1966, p. 12, which reports real estate owned by California associations pur-
suant to CAL. FM. CODE § 6705. As of March 31, 1966, such property was valued at nearly
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Construed liberally, existing law governing federal associations pro-
vides a limited means for association sponsorship of land development.
An association's assets may be invested "in the capital stock, obligations
or other securities of any corporation organized under the laws of the
State ... in which the home office of the association is located, if the
entire capital stock of such corporation is available for purchase only
by savings and loan associations of that State .. . but no association
may make any investment under this sentence if its aggregate outstand-
ing investment . . . would thereupon exceed 1 per centum of its
assets." 71 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) has sought to
limit the functions of such corporations:
Substantially all of the activities of such service corporation (shall)
consist of originating, purchasing, selling and servicing loans
upon real estate and participating interests therein, and/or cleri-
cal, bookkeeping, accounting, statistical, or similar functions
performed primarily for savings and loan associations, plus such
other activities as the Board may approve.72
The Board's regulations could be challenged as an unauthorized effort
to restrict a right granted to associations by Congress.7 3 Or the Board's
interpretation of its regulations might be protested on the grounds
that the regulations are sufficiently broad to sanction land develop-
ment activity.7 4 But a change in the regulations would be more ex-
pedient.
$240 million. All associations eligible do not participate, particularly in current tight
money conditions.
71. 48 Stat. 132 (1933), as amended, 78 Stat. 804-05, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1964), as
amended, 79 Stat. 465, 507, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (Supp. I, 1965).
72. 30 Fed. Reg. 11715 (1965), 12 C.F.R. § 549.9-1(a) (4) (1966).
73. Since land development would ordinarily result in the creation of single family
houses financed by savings association mortgages, an association's entrepreneurial efforts
could be regarded as an elaborate means of "originating loans," a permissible purpose
for service corporations under the Board's present regulations.
74. Sentiment among many savings and loan men reflects this point of view. It is not
wholly unwarranted. When Representative Addonizio of New Jersey introduced H.R.
8647 in 1961, its purpose was to provide for a situation particular to New Jersey, although
the bill was worded to apply to all savings and loan associations.
The Central Corporation of Savings and Loan Associations, a corporation wholly-owned
by the State chartered savings and loan associations of New Jersey, had broad powers
ancillary to the primary activities of the savings and loan business and operated as a
very useful adjunct to the affairs of the co-owning institutions. For example, It could
warehouse mortgages for them. Federal savings and loan associations activated in New
Jersey could not participate in this cooperative organization as they were not empowered
to invest their assets in capital stock. Letter From Hon. Wright Patman, August 2, 1966.
As finally enacted, the bill disappointingly provided only the means of implementing
cooperative data processing primarily for smaller associations. It has not been used
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Better still would be the enactment of an enabling law such as
California Financial Code § 6705, a typical state statute authorizing
association land development:
An association may invest in real property and such invest-
ment may include subdividing and developing real property and
building homes and other buildings on such property principally
for residential use by veterans, housing for the elderly, or urban
renewal or improvement. An association may own, rent, lease,
manage, operate for income, or sell such property. Investments
of an association under this section... shall not at any one time
aggregate more than whichever of the following is the lesser:
(a) Five percent of its total assets.
(b) An amount equal to the sum of its capital, surplus, un-
divided profits, loan reserve, federal insurance reserve, and such
other reserves as the commissioner may prescribe.75
TiHE RISKS OF SAViNGS ASSOCIATION'S BECOIING LAND DEVELOPERS
A statute of this type, if adopted widely, would free savings and loan
associations to become an important factor in the land development
business. AS a result there would probably be some improvement in
the quality of new construction-at least to the extent that poor hous-
ing is attributable to the abundance of undercapitalized sponsors. For
even with a five per cent limitation, association-developers would be
spared the high financing costs and burdensome repayment schedules
that drive many small developers to seek a quick and safe return in
shoddy construction.
But savings associations are in business to make money, not to please
architects. An association developer would be likely to contruct a
new town only if returns on such a well-planned, large-scale develop-
ment promised to exceed yields on poorly planned tracts, shopping
centers or apartment houses. The California statute leaves this choice
entirely to the developer's discretion. If an association found it more
profitable to build housing without amenities, the statute would offer
no reasons for the developer to provide them anyway.
Of course, the associations' powers could be confined to encourage
the financing of high quality building. Larger, well-financed land
development is ordinarily the best; therefore, lending authority might
be limited to projects which exceed minimum acreages, densities, or
costs. Exceptions might be necessary to permit the participation of
extensively. Nevertheless, the FHLBB limitations would seem in accord with Congres-
sional intent. See S. REP. No. 1265, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1964).
75. CAT_ FIN. CODE § 6705 (Supp. 1966).
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small associations and to avoid prejudicing the associations against invest-
ment in urban cores and experimental projects of modest size. As an
alternative, investment authority could be framed in qualitative terms,
permitting only well-designed projects with diverse land uses and
adequate open space for recreation and schools. If present supervisory
agencies had to determine whether proposed investments satisfy the
standard, financial supervisors, short on experience in planning,
would be charged with functions beyond their competence. The task
could be delegated to professional planners and architects.
Planning experts disagree, however, on the precise form which the
city should take to realize the benefits of both urban diversity and
rural amenity. Disciples of Frank Lloyd Wright, committed to open
spaces and increased mobility, dispute the urbanisme of LeCorbusier's
followers; and both groups are opposed by planners in the Garden City
and English New Town tradition as well as by such enthusiasts of
the traditional city as Jane Jacobs. Each of these positions contains
splinter parties, purists and revisionists in endless variety. In sum,
while the prologue, "freer access to natural amenities," 70 appeals to
everyone, there is no consensus on how to go about improving the
urban form.77 Because of these divisions, it probably makes sense to
experiment with different types of urban arrangements and to provide
housing consumers with the widest range of choices The risk that
experimentation might be impaired by a rigid, doctrinaire administra-
tion must be weighed against the prospect of undistinguished outputs
if association investment is to be guided solely by consumer prefer-
ences. Should the question of planning controls stymie efforts to enact
an enabling law, corporations restricted to one per cent of an as-
sociation's assets and closely supervised by the FHLBB, could become
land developing subsidiaries, empowered to conduct pilot projects.
This would give the Board an opportunity to test numerous patterns of
planning controls.
In markets with no backlog of demand for housing, savings associa-
76. Webber, Order in Diversity: Community Without Propinquity, in CIms AND
SPACE 23, 54 (Wingo ed. 1963).
77. See, e.g., GOODMAN & GOODMAN, COMMUNITAS 3-116 (2d rev. cd. 1960); Wurster,
The Form and Structure of the Future Urban Complex, in CITIES AND SPACE 73 (Wingo ed.
1963).
78. "It seems that only by maximizing the opportunities for free choice can an opti-
mum balance be achieved. This requires, among other things, large-scale experimental
residential developments to test different combinations of density, coverage, and design,
since the average person's imagination is too limited to prefer something he has never
seen." TUNNARD & PusHKAREv, op. cit. supra note 1, at 70-71.
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tion competition might dislodge existing well-financed builders and
developers. Membership in the FSLIC and FHLB programs provides
associations with cheaper capital than land development companies
can procure79 and associations are taxed at lower than corporate
rates because of a favorable deduction for bad debt reserves.80 These
advantages might permit savings associations to displace more efficient
land developers.
But the supposed tax inequality between associations and land
developers is an illusion. Associations' gains from land development
are taxed at regular corporate rates; on that portion of their portfolio
which is invested directly in real estate, their bad debts reserves are
calculated in the same way as those of ordinary land development con-
cerns.
79. The FHLB operates through twelve banks. They serve as central credit banks for
member institutions and have no contact with the public other than through the sale
of consolidated obligations. The maximum borrowing limit of any member is set at an
amount not exceeding 507 of its total savings balances. Within this tolerance, a line of
credit is established for each member institution. Interest rates to members vary with
the length of the loan period and the state of the capital market. In 1964, they were as
high as 4.5% and as low as 3.227 at various regional banks. See FHLBB, 1964 A,,ULAL
R'oRT 104-05 (1965).
The FSLIC insures savings accounts of savings and loan associations up to $10,000. In
carrying out its function, the FSLIC may take over the assets of a defaulting institution,
take over loans of a defaulting institution, or make direct loans to help rehabilitate. In-
sured institutions pay a regular annual premium of 1/12 of 1% of the total of all savings
and creditor obligations outstanding and certain reserve prepayments. See FHLBB supra,
at 30-42. While direct loans are infrequent, the fact of insurance increases depositor con-
fidence and lowers the rate of dividends required to attract savings. See generally, 1965
FACT BooK 109-25.
80. Savings associations may compute the bad debt deduction from taxable income by
adding an amount determined to be a reasonable addition to the reserve for losses on non-
qualifying loans (INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 593(b) (1)(A)), plus the reserve for qualified
real property loans (defined in INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 593 (e)(1) as "any loan secured
by an interest in real property which is to be improved out of the proceeds of the loan')
which may be determined under one of the following three methods: (1) An amount
determined by experience to be a reasonable reserve for losses; (2) an amount equal to
the amount necessary to increase the reserve for losses to 3 per cent of qualifying real
property loan outstanding at the dose of the taxable year, (3) an amount equal to 60 per
cent of the taxable income for such year less the amount deducted for nonqualif)ing
loans provided the difference does not exceed the amount necessary to increase the balance
of reserve for losses for qualifying real property loans to 6 per cent of such loans outstand.
ing at the close of the taxable year. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 593(b)(2)- (4). However, the
deduction is limited to the greater of the amount under method 1 or the amount of
total bad debt deduction for qualifying and non-qualifying loans which equals the
amount by which 12 per cent of total deposits at the dose of the year exceeds the sum
of surplus, undivided profits, and reserves at the beginning of the year. INr. REv. CODE or
1954, § 593(b)(1)(B). See Hearings on the Treasury Department Report on Taxation of
Mutual Savings Banks and Savings and Loan Associations, supra note 42, at 7-19.
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The associations derive their real competitive advantage from the
FSLIC and FHLB programs. Conceivably, associations could be au-
thorized to create land development companies funded entirely by
uninsured public subscription. But unless funds were diverted from
savings accounts, these corporations would have no appreciable effect
on the availability of loans for undercapitalized building. Association
management might convince potential savers to invest in development
companies instead. If these companies failed, however, confidence in
the industry would decline, thus creating some of the consequences
the FSLIC was designed to prevent. Perhaps the best way to limit
unfair competition is to follow the practice of some states and autho-
rize a public administrator to withhold approval of any project which
creates an excessive danger to existing development.8'
Various calamities which might result from land development by
savings associations can be imagined, but none of them seems very
likely. Land prices might rise as savings associations bid for suburban
and exurban land suitable for a subdivision. A priori, it is just as likely
that the entry of association developers will decrease land prices.
Present prices are inflated by vendors who must take back mortgages
or trust deeds for most of the purchase price. The magnitude of in-
flation is reflected in the appraisal practices of the Los Angeles County
Tax Assessor; he assumes that for every dollar which the vendor
finances, one dollar is added to the purchase price.8 2 Vendor financing
is unnecessary when savings associations purchase.
Another fear is that association insiders will take illicit profits by
selling their own land to the company at excessive prices. But manage-
ment's existing power to issue mortgages based on their own appraisals
offers as much opportunity for fraudulent self-dealing as the power to
purchase real estate. In either case, the association can be protected
by supervisory agents who make periodic reappraisals.83
81. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 792.7.
82. The Rule is not inflexible. For sound first mortgages with 30% down, the discount
may be as low as 25%; for second mortgages or subordinated purchase money mortgages
with smaller equities, the discount may run as high as 80%. Interview With Carl Lusk,
appraisal office of the Los Angeles County Tax Assessor, Aug. 18, 1966.
83. The California Division of Savings and Loan currently engages in such a practice-
spot-checking approximately 5% of loans with reappraisals. A quantitative measure of
the divergence between the Division's policy and the associations' policy may appear
through such reappraisals, and may lead to a full evaluation of other potential divcr-
gencies. In one recent case, 15% of an association's net worth was frozen into reserves on
the basis of an audit of six months' lending. This, needless to say, is a potent deterrent.
Interview With J. Walter Lautenberger, Jr., Senior Research Analyst, Calif. Div. of Savings
and Loan, Los Angeles, Calif., July 8, 1966.
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If equity investment proves successful small builders who depend on
savings associations for financing might lose their primary source of
funds. To the extent that small builders act as developers, acquiring
land and planning sites, they should be displaced by larger investors.
Using vendor financing they pay more for land. Unlike large builders,
they purchase sites at premiums within a year of development instead
of three to five years earlier.84 They tend to buy smaller tracts,85 to
the chagrin of rural vendors who prefer to sell entire tracts or farms;
and, as noted at the outset, they plan sites improperly. But the ac-
tivities of small builders as developers must be distinguished from
their conduct as house builders. Marginal developers, who crowd
houses together on small parcels and even then lose money on land
acquisition, earn their profits by constructing houses.3 0 These builders
could continue their construction activities within the context of large,
planned communities. The prevailing practices of huge land devel-
84. Hmzo, op. cit. supra note 2, at 25, 6668.
85. There are no studies on the size tract which a small subdivider develops. The fact
that they are small is evident from the economic size of the builders themselves. People
conversant with the mechanics of development are in accord that the small develop small
tracts and the large develop either large or small tracts. Interview With Kent Williams,
supra note 50. One may also resort to statistics on the average size of tracts. Wile densities
vary with the topography and zoning, 3 to 5 houses per acre is probably accurate for
Southern California. In 1963, 1964 and 1965, for e.xample, the records of the Los Angeles
County Engineer indicate that subdivisions (five units or more) in the county and
municipalities averaged 29.2, 26.6, and 26.2 units-or 5 to 8 acres each. Other sources feel
that 30 acres is a more representative average. Interview With John Malone, supra note 19.
The difficulty with such figures is that they do not establish the size of the builder or of his
tracts- only that there are many small tracts. Similarly, construction loan figures might be
employed to substantiate these assertions vividly, but they are not easily obtained and thoze
available do not discriminate between loans on entire projects and loans on individual
units. Many lenders record separate mortgages on each unit in a tract to protect them-
selves from unpaid mechanics. Interview With Walter Clark, supra note 50. See. e.g.,
CAr- SAvINGs AND LoAN Comm'N, 1964 ANNUAL RE'ORT 28 (1965), wherein the following
data appears:
CoNmsMucnoN LoANs MA nE-1964
Number of Per Cent of Average Loan to
Purpose Loans Total Loans Amount Value
Speculative
Construction 30,443 20.3 $34,352 74.6
Construction
By Owner 14,789 10.6 $36,860 70.8
(Speculative construction is here used in the sense of any construction "for or by a
borrower that he intends to see or dispose of upon completion of the construction.')
86. Cf. HEazoG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 45-46.
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opers are illustrated by the Irvine Company now developing 88,000
acres in Orange County, California, and Home Savings and Loan
Association of California (assets over two billion dollars) with more
than $44 million in real estate other than association premises.87 These
developers sell parcels in subdivisions marked for expensive housing
to small builders, many of whom are the master craftsmen of the con-
struction industry, specializing in custom houses.88 If large builders
relied more on prefabrication or industrialized parts, they might be
so much more efficient than small builders as to displace them even in
luxury markets.89 But housebuilders large and small tend to employ
similar production techniques, and the concern which builds 100
houses per year is nearly as efficient as the largest firms.0°
Some people fear that builders in a savings association project will
be forced to obtain construction and "take out" financing exclusively
from the land developing association. But state and federal anti-trust
laws are available to police such arrangements.91
Another anxiety is that associations instead of charging excessive
loan fees will lose vast sums if permitted to invest in undeveloped land.
The limited available data suggest that undeveloped land does not
deserve its notoriety as a risky investment. In the last decade land
investment has yielded an 18% return with fewer foreclosures than
87. CAL. SAVINGS AND LOAN COMM'N, op. cit. supra note 85, at 58.
88. Interview With Raymond Watson, Irving Co., Orange County, Calif., Aug. 6, 1966,
Interview With Leonard Lockhardt, Manager, Mortgage Loan Dept., Home Savings and
Loan Association, Los Angeles, Calif., July 7, 1966. This practice is also carried on in the
construction of other new communities. See WEAVER op. cit. supra note 11, at 23-24. See
also Hearings on S1354, supra note 21, at 397 ("By and large, in our industry, the small
builders will buy from a land developer who is not a whole lot bigger, economically,
than he is.").
89. The present prefabrication package may vary from 25 per cent to 90 per cent of the
material comprising the house. Prefabricated housing accounts for less than one-tenth of
all residential building, and the largest prefabricator in the United States produced
only 30,000 dwellings in 1960. MEYERSON, TE r & WHEATON, op. cit. supra note 19, at
113-16.
90. When the homebuilder reaches the 500-800 units per year output level, he
experiences no further significant economies. MABSEL, Op. cit. supra note 19, at 221. On the
other hand, most builders of over 100 units a year manage to some extent to accumulate
sufficient reserves to inaugurate new and larger projects, ride out the fluctuations of the
building cycles, fund their own land acquisition and development, and generally establish
a forceful bargaining position vis-a-vis lenders, contractors, and suppliers. 1-EzoC, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 22-27.
91. Indeed, the whole parade of antitrust horribles-tying, exclusive dealing, market
division, monopolization-are all possible under this scheme, but there is no reason to
believe that their occurrence will be any more probable here than in the myriad of other
savings and loan operations.
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conventional home mortgages. - Were savings associations to become
land developers, it would be appropriate to monitor their activity for
its effects on land prices, large and small house builders, the quality of
suburban land development, conflicts of interests, and anti-trust
violations. But the chance of gains through better-financed land devel-
opment outweighs the risks involved in experimenting.
Our conclusions are necessarily tentative due to a lack of supporting
data on many crucial points. We do not know enough about the prac-
tices of savings associations to do more than surmise how management
would react to increased investment powers; we are unable to predict
their reactions with confidence. And, further, we can only guess at the
ways in which institutional lenders do or could alter the processes of
land development. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has obtained
$500,000 to study the savings association industry with a view to im-
proving its financial soundness. But we also need to design a system
for depicting the complex relationships between the private land lend-
ers and land planning. Perhaps there would be greater interest in such
an endeavor if the Federal Home Loan Bank Board had remained
within that network of agencies now incorporated in the Department
of Housing and Urban Development. Short of a merger of finance and
planning agencies, connections may be drawn between land finance
institutions and planning goals through the exploration of specific
hypotheses for law reform, such as we have sought to initiate here.
92. Interview With Russell C. Chase, supra note 46. A study in Southern California
conducted by an independent agency on behalf of Property Research, Inc. revealed that,
proportionately, the ratio of raw land mortgage defaults to conventional mortgage
defaults may be as high as 1 to 50. FHA mortgages on housing in the study area, for
example, experienced a default rate of 1.9%. In two counties within the area, Riverside
and Ventura, on parcels of land of forty acres or more, default rates were .028% and
.015%, respectively. Interview With Kent Williams, supra note 50. Long term mortgages,
on the other hand, are eminently safer than construction mortgages. Interview With
J. Walter Lautenberger, supra note 83.
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